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A B S T R A C T
Energy security is an ambiguous concept. Growing academic interest has aimed at defining, conceptualising and
measuring energy security, often through indicators. Energy policy in the European Union (EU) is not concerned
with energy security’s ambiguous conceptualisation, nor does it use energy security indicators, but it refers
consistently to security as one of its primary aims. In this paper, by analysing the use of energy security both in
scientific publications and in EU policy, we argue that the ambiguity of the concept plays a function in the policy
process and is only seen as a problem in the academic literature. Building on the uncertainty literature, we
conceptualise ambiguity as the type of uncertainty that emerges from complexity. Complexity leads to the ex-
istence of multiple representations of a system, which may serve different purposes in the policy process, gen-
erating ambiguity. Uncertainty is mobilised to frame energy policy as a matter of security. This has implications
for the science-policy interface: on one hand, the analysis suggests that science’s aim of providing holistic as-
sessments and clarifications may not serve its desired instrumental purpose in policymaking; on the other,
ambiguity allows for materially ineffective policy measures to persist in the name of energy security.
1. Introduction
Energy security has received growing attention in European Union
(EU) and United States (US) public policy since the early 2000s, re-
viving a concept that had been predominant during the oil crises of the
1970s [1]. While persisting as a priority in national agendas, its defi-
nition has evolved in time. Up to World War II, energy security was tied
to the supply of fuels for the military [1], linking the concept of security
to the military narrative. According to Lippman, “a nation is secure to
the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values,
if it wishes to avoid war, and is able … to maintain them by victory in
such a war” [2]. With the oil embargo of the 1970s, energy security
became part of political diplomacy and geopolitical concerns. In this
context, it referred to the risks of depending on oil imports, and on the
vulnerability of oil trade to international diplomacy and political in-
stability in producing countries. With the publication of the report “The
limits to growth” (Meadows et al. 1972), security was also tied to the
possibility of physical scarcity of non-renewable energy sources.
Starting from the 2000s, the term has been increasingly associated with
resilience based on a complex systems perspective [1], with the re-
source scarcity narrative based on concerns for the depletion of fossil
fuel reserves [3], and with renewable energy based on the challenges of
a renewable transition [4–6]. Challenges and solutions offered by spe-
cific primary energy sources, such as gas, coal, uranium, shale gas and
variable renewable sources have also contributed to the proliferation of
definitions of energy security. In the EU, security concerns became
central to the energy policy agenda following the 2005–09 gas and oil
disputes between Russia and Ukraine, and between Russia and Belarus
[7]. As the electrification of energy systems gradually increases to in-
corporate a higher share of renewable energy, energy security has also
evolved to incorporate dimensions that are unique to electricity, such as
the security of transnational grids [8].
The reintroduction of energy security in policy agendas has sparked
academic debates that can be grouped under the field of energy security
studies. The view that energy is a key input to all economic processes is
widespread in these studies [9,10], and in disciplines such as ecological
economics [11–13]. Characterisations of energy security range from the
availability of primary energy sources [10], to the stability of internal
markets [14], to the affordability at consumer level [3]. While avail-
ability and affordability are the two dimensions most commonly asso-
ciated with energy security [3,10,14–18], it has been linked to a
number of other aspects, including for example sustainability [3], so-
vereignty and resilience [1]. The ubiquity of energy security, and its
context-dependent nature [18,19], have been the object of a branch of
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security papers exploring the ambiguity of the concept. Ciută [9] ex-
plains the multiplicity of definitions of energy security as a result of the
fact that “energy security is a complexity model with interlocking
segments and levels of interaction” [p. 132]. Energy security studies
recognise that the security of modern energy systems has different
characteristics than those attributed to the concept in the 1970s, among
other factors because of the increased importance of renewable energy,
and attempt to handle the multiple dimensions that are associated with
this polysemic concept [19], which sometimes mixes technical and
colloquial definitions of energy security.
From a policy perspective, the growing focus given to energy se-
curity in EU policy from the early 2000s follows a trend of securitisation
of energy issues [20], i.e. “a process where governments frame energy
as an existential threat to state interests” [21, p.114]. This is in contrast
with previous framings of the 1990s, when energy had been mostly
relegated to the technical domain, as highlighted by Kuzemko [22] for
the case of the UK. Energy security has long been a recurring theme for
many national agendas of countries that are poor in primary energy
sources, often used as a justification for disparate policy measures. This
was highlighted for the US by MIT economist Paul Joskow [23]: “There
is one thing that has not changed since the early 1970s. If you cannot
think of a reasoned rationale for some policy based on standard eco-
nomic reasoning, then argue that the policy is necessary to promote
‘energy security’” [p. 7].
From a governance perspective, energy security is used both as a
means to mobilise uncertainty and as a material issue. The multiple
definitions provided by academia and the overflow of information do
not lead to paralysis-by-analysis, as proven by the fact that the concept
of energy security is recurrently used in policy. It is due to the very
existence of multiple definitions that one may view energy security as
characterised by ambiguity. Focusing at the interface between science
and policy, there is a clear gap between the conceptualisations and
measurements of energy security in academia, and the (non-)issue of
ambiguity in policymaking [24].
Although some authors recognise that ambiguity plays a role in
policy-making [25–27], scientific literature largely sees ambiguity as a
problem and aims at reducing this type of uncertainty. Stirling [27]
argues that ambiguity is a type of uncertainty due not to lack of
knowledge, but to the existence of “contradictory certainties”. He
submits that the real challenge at the science-policy interface is the
failure to recognise this type of uncertainty and to reduce all scientific
advice to risk assessment. However, this insight has fallen through and
scholars that analyse the science-policy interface still argue for reducing
ambiguity. We argue that the role of ambiguity in governance is poorly
understood and that reducing ambiguity may not always be functional
in policymaking. This is in contrast with the predominant view that
scientists should work towards the clarification of slippery concepts:
Wellstead et al. [28], for example, recognise that policy problems and
solutions can be framed in different ways, leading to ambiguity, yet
argue that scientists should take a normative stand and support a spe-
cific framing in order to reduce said ambiguity.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of
ambiguity as distinct from other types of uncertainty, drawing from
complexity theory. We use energy security as our empirical reference.
We analyse and compare the multiple representations of energy se-
curity in scientific literature and in EU policy documents, and assess the
level of uncertainty associated with each representation. Even though
energy security is recurrently described as an ambiguous concept, to
our knowledge no attempts have been made at conceptualising ambi-
guity in this context, nor to theorise the role of ambiguity in energy
governance.
Because the contribution of this paper is primarily theoretical, we
first develop a theoretical background that conceptualises ambiguity as
the type of uncertainty created by complexity, and we discuss the im-
plications of ambiguity for the science-policy interface. We use text
analysis to identify the different types of uncertainty, including
ambiguity, mentioned in scientific publications and EU policy docu-
ments. Section 3 introduces the materials and methods used. The results
(Section 4) show the multiple scales of analysis used to define energy
security and the types of uncertainty associated with it. Based on our
results, we return to the discussion of how this type of uncertainty does
not lead to paralysis in the policy process in the EU context, but rather
provides a rationale for materially ineffective policy measures. We
conclude the paper by arguing that our finding about the (non-)issue of
energy security definitions at the science-policy interface has theore-
tical implications for the role of ambiguity as distinct from other dif-
ferent types of uncertainty in policy processes, which requires a careful
consideration of the limits of holistic assessments in guiding policy.
2. Conceptualising ambiguity
In general terms, energy security is recurrently linked to risk [26],
uncertainty [29] and ambiguity [9,16–19,25,26,29–31]. Because of the
extensive use of these terms, it is important to clarify their meaning. In
this paper, we draw upon the work of Knight, Stirling and Wynne
[32–34] on uncertainty, and of Funtowicz and Ravetz, Zellmer et al.,
Strand, Kovacic and Giampietro [35–38] on complexity.
Knight [32] first introduced the distinction between risk and strict
uncertainty in economics in his foundational work in the 1920s, de-
fining risk as a situation in which the possible outcomes are known and
the probabilities associated with each outcome can be calculated. Strict
uncertainty is defined as a situation in which the possible outcomes are
known but the associated probabilities cannot be calculated. We speak
of “strict uncertainty” to distinguish the technical definition of un-
certainty from the general study of uncertainty, which includes risk,
strict uncertainty, ignorance, indeterminacy and ambiguity. In the case
of energy security, strict uncertainty can be associated with events such
as price volatility [26], and disruptive events such as tsunamis [29],
which are known to occur, but cannot be precisely predicted. The no-
velty introduced by Knight is that uncertainty is conceptualised as a
matter of degrees of (lack of) knowledge1 .
Building on the idea of degrees of uncertainty, Wynne [34] identi-
fies four types of uncertainty: (i) risk, in which the odds are known, (ii)
strict uncertainty, in which “we know what we don’t know”, (iii) ig-
norance, in which “we don’t know what we don’t know”, and (iv) in-
determinacy or systemic uncertainty, in which “causal chains or net-
works are open”. With regard to energy security, ignorance may be
associated with geopolitical threats derived from “insecure political and
unstable economic environments” [39], as well as with the emergence
of new technologies, such as fracking, which introduce unforeseen
opportunities and risks. Indeterminacy is associated with systemic
changes, or what some authors call phase changes. “Threats like de-
livery disruptions or global warming of more than 2 °C can be seen as
phase changes, because in addition to having a direct impact on con-
sumers they also change the way in which the system works” [13 p.11].
In the context of indeterminacy, uncertainty is irreducible, as systemic
changes reduce the possibility of knowing.
Stirling [33] reorganises Wynne’s levels of uncertainty in a 2×2
matrix, which ranges from known to unknown outcomes and known
and unknown probabilities, and introduces ambiguity as an additional
type of uncertainty. Once again, risk is defined as known outcomes and
known probabilities, strict uncertainty as known outcomes and
1 Knight’s definition of risk has been criticised in the literature for not taking
into account “how people perceive uncertain phenomena and how their inter-
pretations and responses are determined by social, political, economic and
cultural contexts, and judgments” [32 p. 237]. The concept of risk is thus not
fully captured by a technical definition of calculable probabilities and effects.
Renn et al. [93] criticize the reduction of risk to calculable probabilities for this
concept may lead to the use of “technocratic, decisionistic and economic
models of risk assessment and management” [p. 234].
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unknown probabilities, and ignorance as unknown outcomes and un-
known probabilities. According to Stirling, ambiguity is defined as a
situation in which probabilities are known but outcomes are unknown.
The ambiguity of outcomes is not necessarily due to lack of knowledge,
but to the fact that one cannot predict which of the known outcomes
will be realised [27], because of divergent and contested perspectives
on the justification, severity or wider meanings associated with a per-
ceived threat [40]. In their historical analysis of the evolution of energy
security, Cherp and Jewell [1] discuss how the concept has been used to
pursue different outcomes. The concept of ambiguity thus suggests that
uncertainty may be mobilised to pursue different goals, not because of a
lack of information, but because a plurality of representations can be
accommodated.
In the context of uncertainty, the linear model of science speaking
truth to power is questioned, not only because science may produce
incomplete knowledge, but also because social and political threats
indicate that decisions cannot be reduced to rational, utility-max-
imising, get-the-facts-then-act models [41,42]. With regard to energy
security, distinguishing between different levels of uncertainty is cri-
tical for decision-making. For example, after the Fukushima accident,
experts declared that new designs for nuclear power plants took into
account the risk of earthquakes [43]. Better designs, however, do not
solve the uncertainty linked to the unpredictability of earthquakes and
tsunamis. Safer designs refer to advances in the reduction of operating
risk at the level of the power plant. Strict uncertainty about earthquake
forecasting (higher levels of uncertainty) cannot be factored into new
nuclear designs. The undistinguished reference to uncertainty with
disregard to the type of uncertainty in question may create a false il-
lusion of control, and a diffuse understanding of the role, and limits, of
scientific knowledge in decision-making.
Stirling’s reference to open causality and unpredictability invokes
complexity. Many authors have studied the implications of complexity
for governance and public policy [35,37,44–46]. In this literature,
complexity is often defined in opposition to simplicity [37,45], and as a
criticism of the instrumental understanding of the system to be gov-
erned through the lenses of reductionism, determinism, predictability
and mono-causality. Positive definitions of complexity, however, are
many and contrasting.
Strand [37] distinguishes between thin and thick complexity, Geyer
[47] speaks of reductionist complexity, soft complexity and complexity
thinking as a new epistemology of science, and Salthe [48] provides
five definitions of complexity ranging from measurable complexity to
ontological complexity. Thin and reductionist complexity can be used
as a means to recognise “reality” as differentiated and changing. A
system is defined as complex if the whole presents emerging properties
that cannot be inferred by analysing only the components of the system.
The non-linearity and emerging properties of complex systems chal-
lenge predictability. Thin complexity departs from the positivist and
reductionist use of scientific facts that underpins the linear model of
science speaking truth to power. In this case, complexity is also used to
reject post-modernism [49], and to postulate the existence of a complex
“reality” out there, whose complexity is independent of the observer.
Concepts of thick complexity and complexity thinking, as well as
Salthe’s [48] insistence on the role of the observer in all definitions of
complexity, create an understanding of complexity as a consequence of
analytical choices as much as of what is observed. In this view, com-
plexity requires the use of multiple scales of analysis [36,50,51], so that
both local rules of interaction between system components and emer-
ging properties of the whole can be observed. These multiple ob-
servations, however, are not reducible to one another, leading to the
existence of non-equivalent descriptive domains [38,52].
The epistemology of complexity does not refer to knowledge about
complex systems, but rather yields a relational understanding of
knowledge as the correspondence between what is observed and what is
modelled, building on Rosen’s modelling relation [53]. For this reason,
both Salthe [48] and Kovacic and Giampietro [38] refer to Peirce’s
semiotics [54], the study of signs as a triadic relation between re-
presentation, application and interpretation of experiences. That is,
knowledge cannot be separated from action. As Strand [37] argues
“craftsmanship and tacit quality judgments play an integral part in the
process of transformation from a scientific finding to a fact.” Rather
than the study of systems “out there,” complexity is the study of “ho-
lons” [55], that is, the relationship between (i) the knowledge gener-
ated, (ii) the choice of narratives defining causality between ob-
servables [38], and (iii) the choice of a temporal scale of the model,
determining how knowledge is updated with experience (as an appli-
cation of the knowledge itself) [43].
Similar to uncertainty, complexity poses a challenge to the interface
between science and policy. Complexity theory is used by many authors
to critique the use of reductionist science to guide decision-making
[44–46], and is used to encourage more pragmatic, humble, reflexive
and adaptive approaches to policy making [37,38,45,56]. Complexity is
also used to describe the policy process as affected by negative and
positive feedbacks, attractors and path dependence [44,46]. In line with
our aim of conceptualising ambiguity and its role in governance, we
build on the relational understanding of complexity as a means to cri-
tically re-think the implications of limited and contradictory knowledge
for decision-making. Semiotics can be used to argue that science plays a
role in the creation of emergent complexity [35]. For instance, through
technology, scientific research is also a form of intervention in the
world [37].
We argue that the contribution of complexity theory consists not so
much in the type of science advice that can be derived from the con-
cepts of emergence, non-linearity, open causality, self-organisation, etc.
Geyer and Cairney [44] correctly remark that these concepts are
newish, as the messiness of policy making has been long studied in
political science with no need to make reference to complexity. Rather,
we submit that complexity theory is most usefully deployed in ques-
tioning the relationship between science and policy. Rather than
speaking a more nuanced and complex truth to power, relational
complexity makes it possible to analyse the mutual relation between
science, scientific truths and power. The linear model relies on the ra-
tional use of scientific facts produced by supposedly neutral scientists.
Questioning the linear model requires taking a critical stance also with
regard to scientific facts and the role of experts. The epistemic pluralism
[57] of complexity is an alternative concept to monolithic and unifiable
truths of Newtonian science. Therefore, the study of ambiguity may
lead to insights about the role of experts.
Building on Stirling’s definition of ambiguity as a type of un-
certainty, we conceptualise ambiguity as the uncertainty created by the
existence of multiple non-equivalent representations of the same issue.
Ambiguity is thus not just a matter of different opinions, as may be the
case of the rise in the price of oil (perceived as beneficial by oil pro-
ducers and problematic by oil importers). In linking ambiguity to
complexity, we argue that this type of uncertainty is caused by the
existence of incommensurability in the knowledge base. That is, al-
though a lot of information can be produced about energy security,
there is no univocal way to combine these representations, as can be
seen in the proliferation of energy security indicators [17,25,39] and of
academic papers dedicated to the conceptualisation of energy security
[26,31].
The role of ambiguity in policy has been widely analysed in the
literature [33,58–61]. According to Matland [58], ambiguity is neces-
sary to limit conflict (ambiguity of goals), and to define policy when
there is uncertainty over the technology needed or over the role that
various organisations are to play in the implementation process (am-
biguity of means). With reference to the EU, Zahariadis [59] explains
that ambiguity is an integral part of the policy making process in
contexts where there is a plurality of, often contrasting, interests, a
multiplicity and high turnover of actors, and highly bureaucratic sys-
tems that cause a fragmentation of the policy process. Shackley and
Wynne [62] suggest that ambiguity may not only be preferred over
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Table 1
Definitions of energy security from the scientific literature.
Paper Framing (definition/dimensions) of energy security Uncertainties Scales
Bahgat [66] Security defined differently w.r.t. price: “security involves
achieving a state where the risk of rapid and severe
fluctuation of prices is reduced or eliminated”. W.r.t.
technology: “Energy security depends on sufficient levels
of investment in resource development, generation
capacity and infrastructure to meet demand as it grows”.
W.r.t. to diversification: “Security of supplies can be
enhanced by an overall diversification of supply”.
Risk:
In relation to price volatility: “In respect of price, security
involves achieving a state where the risk of rapid and
severe fluctuation of prices is reduced or eliminated”.
Risk of dependence.
Threats can be geological or geopolitical.
Global, energy system
Long-term
Bielecki [10] Definition: “reliable and adequate supply of energy at
reasonable prices”
Risk:
“Short-term security covers the risks of disruption to
existing supplies due to technical problems, extreme
weather conditions or political disruptions. By contrast, the
long-term security focuses on the risks that new supplies
may not be brought on stream on time to meet growing
demand”
Global, national
Long-term, short-term
Cherp & Jewell [1] Three perspectives: sovereignty (political science),
robustness (engineering), resilience (economics/complex
systems)
Ambiguity
Energy security challenges are increasingly entangled so
that they cannot be analysed within the boundaries of any
single perspective
Global, national
Chester [19] Six aspects: 1) risk management; 2) reliance on imports; 3)
strategic use of the term; 4) its temporal dimension; 5)
differences between energy markets and 6) how different
actors have different perspectives on security
Risk: “the risk of interrupted, unavailable energy supplies;
the risk of insufficient capacity to meet demand; the risk of
unaffordable energy prices; the risk of reliance on
unsustainable sources of energy. These risks may be caused
by energy market instabilities, technical failures or physical
security threats”
Ignorance:
“The meaning of energy security differs over the short,
medium and long term because the probability, likelihood
and consequences of different risks or threats to supply will
vary over time.”
International, national
Short, medium and long term
Ciuta [9] Three logics: a logic of war for energy security (what
states do war with/over), a logic of subsistence (energy
need, complexity model of interacting parts) and a logic of
‘total’ energy security (ubiquity and reflexivity)
Risk:
Can also be called “challenges” or “threats” and “vary from
market failures and price volatility to investment risks,
network disruptions and import dependency”.
Ambiguity:
“Energy security clearly means many different things to
different authors and actors, and even at times to the same
author or actor.”
Global and international,
energy system
Costantini et al. [64] Refers to IEA definition “Energy security is defined as the
availability of a regular supply of energy at an affordable
price” and to the dimensions identified by the European
Commission: physical, economic, social and
environmental
Strict uncertainty:
Makes the distinction between reserves and resources: the
more the energy system depends on resources, the more
uncertain it is. There is great uncertainty about oil supply
from Middle East & Africa. Gas supply is less uncertain.
International, national,
consumers
Short-term and long-term
Hughes [5] Refers to IEA definition: "the reliable supply of energy at
an affordable price". 4 R.s: review of supply and
infrastructure; reduce through conservation and
efficiency; replace insecure supplies with secure ones
through diversification and renewables; restriction of new
demand
Indeterminacy:
In many of the above examples, replacement policies that
were introduced to improve energy security have,
overtime, become energy-security problems in their own
right. This reflects the temporal nature of replacement
programs based upon finite supplies, from natural gas to
agricultural energy crops.
Global energy market, energy
system, consumer
Jansen & Seebregts
[31]
Affordably and competitively priced, environmentally
acceptable energy end-use services by the term energy
services security (ESS)
Strict uncertainty:
Resilience as a means to reduce uncertainty - “Enhancing
societal resilience against long-term price volatility in the
face of the strong inertia of national or regional energy
systems”
National, regional, society,
consumers
Long-term
Jun et al. [17] "Energy security can be defined as a reliable and
uninterrupted supply of energy sufficient to meet the
needs of the economy at the same time, coming at a
reasonable price"
Risk and strict uncertainty
Related to reliability of supply
Dependence of OECD countries on oil supplied from
politically unstable regions; increasing energy demands
worldwide for the next few decades in line with emerging
economies and rapidly growing
developing countries; increasing concerns for oil and other
fossil fuel depletion, localized geopolitical instability
Global, international
dynamics, national
Kiriyama & Kajikawa
[29]
A shift from ensuring self-sufficiency of primary energy to
diversification of secondary energy supply
Risk and strict uncertainty:
Risks are quantified: “to appropriately assess the types of
risk posed by hazards, we should consider essential societal
changes— macro or micro, economic, political, social,
environmental, scientific, technological, human health,
etc.—taking into account future uncertainties.”
Ambiguity:
The degree of ambiguity “resulting from energy security
being open to more than one interpretation when
bibliometrics are applied” is quantified. Ambiguity here
National, energy system
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (continued)
Paper Framing (definition/dimensions) of energy security Uncertainties Scales
arises from the multiple perspectives of energy security
literature.
Kruyt et al. [15] 4 dimensions: availability (geological), accessibility
(geopolitical), affordability (economical) and
acceptability (environmental)
Risk:
Supply and disruption risks, political stability risks, price
movement risk
Strict uncertainty:
Uncertain reserves estimates
Global, international, energy
system
Long-term, short-term
Leung [18] A supply-based definition for China, where the quest is for
a "reliable and adequate supply of oil"
Ambiguity:
‘energy security’ is not a self-explanatory concept and
researchers should formulate and contextualize it when
applying it to a given country.
“China’s current energy security measures aim at the quest
for a ‘reliable and adequate supply of oil,’ but pay less
attention to the maintenance of ‘reasonable prices.’ It is
because ‘reasonable prices’ per se is an elusive goal and is
judged by subjective criteria.”
National, energy system
Medium to long-term
Mansson et al. [4] Security has evolved from meaning security of oil supply
to including energy carriers. In industrialized countries,
“energy security tend to be more closely connected to
provision of energy access to the poorest in rural areas
and, in urban areas, access for the rapidly expanding
industry and service sectors”. Two dimensions: physical
and economic
Risk: For the case of markets, makes the distinction
between specific, systematic and systemic risk. Specific:
diversifiable (unique to every exported and supply route);
systematic: market risk; systemic: the risk of market
collapse.
National, energy system,
consumers, industry and
service sectors
Natorski & Surallés
[65]
Security in the EU framed in terms of energy supply and
dysfunctions in global energy markets
Strict uncertainty:
“These observations were further aggravated by other
uncertainties surrounding energy, such as the perspectives
for global demand, price volatility, and the actual capacity
of producer countries to supply the energy demanded due
to the lack of necessary investments.”
“Uncertainty could be further aggravated by natural
disasters or other accidents having a negative impact on
energy, especially on prices and accessibility”
Global, EU, national
Sovacool & Brown
[16]
4 dimensions: availability, affordability, efficiency and
environmental stewardship
Ignorance:
Difficult to determine the extent to which countries are
responding to ES challenges related to climate change
Ambiguity:
As a problem to solve: “This study provides precision,
breadth, and standardization to the often ambiguous
concept”
Global, national
Sovacool & Mukherjee
[25]
5 dimensions: availability, affordability, technology
development, sustainability, and regulation
Ambiguity:
“The concept has become diffuse and often incoherent”.
“Energy security is integral to modern society, yet its very
ubiquity makes it prone to market failure and under-
distribution”
Global, national, energy
system
Short and long term
Sovacool et al. [3] “How to equitably provide available, affordable, reliable,
efficient, environmentally benign, proactively governed
and socially acceptable energy services to end-users”. It
has 5 dimensions: availability, affordability, technology
development, sustainability and regulation
Risk:
“The security of supply and the concentration of energy
fuels among countries, theories about peak oil, rising
prices, and energy poverty, to name only a few, have all
become prominent concerns among policymakers and
investors”
Global, national
Umbach [6] Security as a geopolitical issue (security of supply) Strict uncertainty:
Of oil production, oil and gas reserves, of investments, of
mid-term challenges, of reliance on gas imports
Global, EU
Mid to long-term
Winzer [26] "The continuity of energy supplies relative to demand" Ambiguity:
The concept is blurred, elusive, slippery, difficult to define,
umbrella term
Risk and indeterminacy:
“Threats like price volatility or marginal rises of global
temperature can be seen as small changes in the sense that
they have an impact on consumers but don’t change the
way the system works. And threats like delivery disruptions
or global warming of more than 2C can be seen as phase
changes, because in addition to having a direct impact on
consumers they also change the way in which the system
works”
Global, consumers
Yergin et al. [14] The definition of security depends on the country: can be
security of demand, control over strategic resources,
concern over price changes, ability to adjust to new global
markets, diversification, whether to build new nuclear
plants, etc.
Risk and strict uncertainty:
“The growth of Russia's output slowed substantially last
year because of political risks, insufficient investment,
uncertainties over government policy, regulatory obstacles,
and, in some regions, geological challenges.”
“The tens of billions of dollars required to bring the
industry's output back up to its 1978 peak of 3.5 million
barrels per day have not been invested both because of the
continuing attacks on the country's infrastructure and work
force and because of uncertainty about Iraq's political and
National, energy system
(continued on next page)
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knowledge in decision-making, but may also provide more robust sci-
entific tools than those generated by a precise knowledge base. Un-
derstanding the function of ambiguity in the policy process has im-
portant consequences for the interface between science and policy.
Whereas numerous studies argue for more holistic and integrated
conceptualisations of energy security [1,25,29], Matland warns against
the dysfunctional effects of clarity in policy implementation.
The literature on energy security is replete with examples of para-
doxes and inconsistencies that emerge from the multiple definitions of
energy security [1,9,25]. According to Sovacool and Mukherjee [25], a
paradox arises as “energy security is integral to modern society, yet its
very ubiquity makes it prone to market failure and under-distribution”
[p. 5343]. That is, complexity is manifested in the multiple, non-
equivalent representations, conceptualisations and quantifications of
energy security and the resulting heterogeneity of policies. Building on
our analysis of energy security, we will return to the theoretical dis-
cussion of how ambiguity challenges the relationship between science
and policy in the discussion section.
3. Materials and methods
Following our theoretical focus on uncertainty and complexity, we
use text analysis to identify how these concepts are articulated with
regard to energy security. The aim of this analysis is to identify the
multiple representations of energy security across scales, and their level
of uncertainty. Both scientific literature and policy documents are
analysed. As can be expected, scholarly articles focus predominantly on
defining and measuring energy security, and policy documents focus on
identifying different policy measures to increase energy security.
For the literature review, twenty-three papers on energy security
were analysed, published between 2002 and 2014. The papers are
among the most cited on the topic, and provide a comprehensive
spectrum of how energy security is assessed in academia. They include
perspectives from economics, engineering, geopolitics, policy, tech-
nology, political science, finance and geology, and were selected using
citation indexes from Web of Science and the snowballing technique
[63].
On the policy side, focus is given to the EU, which we chose as case
study because (i) energy security has been part of EU policy since the
creation of the EU [1,9], (ii) many of the scientific articles analysed aim
at informing EU policy [6,26,64–66], and (iii) energy security has been
a high priority of the EU policy agenda since the 2008 gas crisis with
Russia [1,6,10,14,66].
Three branches of EU documents are considered: the Energy
Security Strategy (2014) [67], the Clean Energy for All Europeans
package (2016) [68] and energy directives in force [69–72]. Ad-
ditionally, the 2015 State of the Energy Union report [73] is analysed.
The aim of the policy analysis is to obtain an overview of the role
played by energy security in EU policy, of which measures have been
proposed as a means to increase security, of which issues are seen as
problematic and of how uncertainty is handled. Therefore, the policy
analysis is not constrained to legal documents, but also includes press
releases and fact-sheets [74–77], as they can provide valuable insights
into the underlying narratives surrounding energy security in EU policy.
The texts are coded for definitions of energy security and policy
measures, scales and dimensions of analysis, as well as uncertainties,
risks and ambiguities. The categorisation of energy security into dif-
ferent disciplines, domains, dimensions, pillars and principles is pop-
ular in the literature and the terms, often referring to different scales,
are sometimes used interchangeably. Without delving deep into this
categorisation, our interest lies in the different scales and types of un-
certainty. The term scale is used here to refer to geographical dimen-
sions (e.g. city, province, nation, region, world), temporal dimensions
(short-term, long-term), and to hierarchical levels of analysis (energy
system, energy sector, renewables, wind power, wind farm). There is no
1:1 mapping between geographical dimensions and hierarchical levels
of analysis: the energy sector, for example, may refer to a specific
country or to the global economy. This broad category of scale is used
in this paper to capture the multiple levels of granularity used in the
literature to describe energy security. Having identified scales, defini-
tions or dimensions (for academia) and measures (for policy) linked to
energy security, the next section discusses the role that complexity
plays in the energy security knowledge base, and the role that the
ambiguity arising from complexity plays in policy.
4. Representations and uncertainties of energy security
Results start with the analysis of energy security, as approached in
literature. Focus is given to the definitions and dimensions used to
characterise energy security, as well as the type of uncertainty that is
Table 1 (continued)
Paper Framing (definition/dimensions) of energy security Uncertainties Scales
legal structures and the contractual framework for
investment”
Indeterminacy:
“Part of that challenge will be anticipating and assessing
the "what ifs." And that requires looking not only around
the corner, but also beyond the ups and downs of cycles to
both the reality of an ever more complex and integrated
global energy system and the relations among the countries
that participate in it”
Yusta et al. [78] Energy has evolved from supply of affordable energy to a
broader concept including: "price stability, diversification
of energy resources, energy storage, economic
investments, infrastructure protection, political and
military power balance, geopolitics, homeland security,
energy efficiency, energy markets, sustainability"
Risk:
“The term “risk’’ refers to a combination of what can
happen, how likely it is, and its consequences. The term
“threat’ is more related to harmful acts to infrastructure.
‘Vulnerabilities’’ refers to the weakness level of a system to
failures, disasters or attacks”
“In case an emergency arises decision makers must
understand the interdependences in the underlying
infrastructure.”
Supranational, national,
energy system
Zhang et al. [39] Related to import risks Risk:
Four dimensions relating to: external dependence
(dependence risks), supply stability (supply risks), trade
economy (economic risks) and transportation safety
(transportation risks)
Global, international, energy
system
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discussed in relation to these dimensions, and to the relevant scales of
analysis (Table 1). While the first two columns of the table refer to what
was found directly in the text of each article, the third column was
added in order to discuss the multi-scalar character of the concept of
security. The distinction between risks, strict uncertainty, in-
determinacy and ambiguity follows the levels of uncertainty discussed
in the theoretical framework. We analyse all types of uncertainty
mentioned in the documents in order to show how the general argu-
ment for reducing uncertainty is applied indiscriminately to all types of
uncertainty, including ambiguity. Stirling [27] argues that whereas risk
may be usefully described using scientific assessments, strict un-
certainty and ambiguity require humility and the recognition of the
limits of scientific knowledge. Limits are not to be confused with lack of
validity, but are a request for more modest claims. Responding to our
aim of theorising the role of ambiguity in policy processes, we will add
to this argument and show that different types of uncertainty have
different functions in the policy process.
Energy security is connected by different authors to a large number
of dimensions, from availability and affordability to resilience and
technological development. These dimensions are linked to different
scales, ranging from individual technologies to global economy, climate
and reserves. The most common type of uncertainty discussed is risk,
which is strongly linked to security discourses. Ambiguity is also
mentioned, mostly as a problem to be solved, and different types of
uncertainties are identified by different authors, mostly linked to global
resources and supply stability [15,17,64,79] and price volatility
[31,79]. Natural disasters are also mentioned [26,79]. Following the
distinction proposed by Wynne, these events fall under the category of
indeterminacy.
The results of the text analysis of policy documents are shown in
Tables 2a and 2b. Table 2a refers to direct measures, which are cited in
the Energy Security Strategy. Table 2b refers to indirect measures
present in wider EU energy policy, linked to energy security as one of
many aims. The uncertainties reported in the tables are not mentioned
directly in the policies but were identified based on the type of measure
proposed.
Looking at the characterization of energy security in science and
policy, the results of both tables show that: (i) there is interdependence
across scales of analysis, (ii) uncertainty is central to energy security
and (iii) ambiguity is treated differently in science and policy.
There is interdependence across scales of analysis in the dimensions
of energy security used both in the scientific literature and in policy
documents. Energy security is framed as the combination of (i) security
of supply (availability and reliability), and (ii) security of demand
(affordability). The need to match supply and demand requires hand-
ling the interplay of constraints posed by elements external to socio-
economic systems, such as the availability of fossil fuels, solar radiation,
water courses, and elements internal to socio-economic systems, such as
geopolitical concerns, import dependencies, diversification of suppliers,
transportation, infrastructure, technologies, distribution and accessi-
bility issues, and price volatility. The external-internal duality perme-
ates energy security definitions. Moreover, energy security applies to
multiple hierarchical levels of analysis. Demand issues refer to the
distribution of resources at a global, regional and national scale with
regard to energy markets, infrastructure and economic sectors, and at
the individual level with regard to consumers. As a consequence, the
concept of energy security is based on the interdependence between
different hierarchical levels of analysis and the external-internal ob-
servation duality.
Uncertainty is central to the concept of energy security. Degrees of
uncertainty can be seen in the distinction between different threats.
Threats coming from price volatility and technical problems are defined
as risks to the system. Reliability of supply and geopolitical concerns
may be defined as strict uncertainties (known but not quantifiable).
Threats such as peak oil, increasing demand and climate change are
seen as sources of indeterminacy that may cause changes in the system.
Uncertainty is seen as a property of the system with regard to the high
dependence of non-oil producing countries on foreign oil, the high level
of inertia of the energy system, and the ubiquitous use of energy in
economic activities. Risk, strict uncertainty and indeterminacy have a
central role in the definition of energy security. Contrary to ambiguity,
these types of uncertainty provide a common ground for the definition
of energy security for both science and policy.
In policy documents, the interest lies in the sources of uncertainty.
Different sources of uncertainty are used as a means to define and
classify policy measures. Uncertainty of supply is the most recurrent
source of uncertainty mentioned. It is related to import strategies, to
market instability and to technological development. Uncertainty of
demand is also present and is related to improvements in efficiency,
moderating consumption, and reducing carbon emissions. Contingency
measures reveal an additional source of uncertainty, related to ignor-
ance. They include protection and back-up infrastructure, reserves of
critical energy sources, and contingency planning.
Ambiguity plays very different roles in science and policy. While
ambiguity is mentioned in most of the scientific articles analysed, and is
often the central motivation for the work of clarification,
Table 2a
Direct measures of energy security in EU energy security strategy [80], their scales and uncertainties.
Pillar Measures Scales Uncertainties
1. Immediate actions aimed at increasing the EU's capacity to
overcome a major disruption during the winter 2014/
2015 (short term)
Enhance storage capacity, develop reverse flows, develop
security plans at regional level, explore potential of LNG
EU, regional, forms of
energy, energy system
Risk of disruption
2. Strengthening emergency/solidarity mechanisms
including coordination of risk assessments and
contingency plans; and protecting strategic
infrastructure (short term)
Maintain minimum reserves of crude oil and petroleum
products, invest in back-up infrastructure, physical
protection of critical infrastructure, contingency planning/
stress tests
EU, national, energy
sector, forms of energy,
energy sector
Contingency measures to
reduce ignorance
3. Moderating energy demand (short term) Speed up measures to achieve 2020 efficiency targets,
focusing on buildings and industry
Building & industry
sectors
Uncertainty of demand
4. Building a well-functioning and fully integrated internal
market (medium to long term)
Discuss decisions at EU level, develop an internal
electricity market, build key interconnectors
EU, electricity sector Uncertainty of supply
(market)
5. Increasing energy production in the European Union
(medium to long term)
Increase renewables (which will require smart energy
grids and storage capacity), carbon capture & storage
EU, national level, forms
of energy, energy system
Uncertainty of supply
6. Further developing energy technologies (medium to long
term)
Invest in energy research & innovation, financial
instruments to leverage greater investments from industry
EU, national level Technological
uncertainty
7. Diversifying external supplies and related infrastructure Strengthen relationships with existing suppliers, open the
way to new sources, accelerate nuclear safety directive,
ensure new nuclear plants do not depend on Russian fuel
EU, global, types of
energy
Uncertainty of supply
8. Improving coordination of national energy policies and
speaking with one voice in external energy policy
Build an energy union, include energy issues in political
dialogues
EU Ambiguity
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conceptualisation and/or classification of energy security, the worry
about ambiguity is virtually absent from policy documents. Despite the
ambiguity of the concept highlighted in the literature, energy security is
an important priority in EU policy. This finding is consistent with the
study of the use of energy security in the UK [87]. Energy security is
mentioned consistently throughout all EU energy policy documents
analysed, although less so in the non-legal documents of the Clean
Energy for All Europeans package, where, as the name suggests, focus is
shifted to consumers.
Ambiguity is used in EU energy policy in a variety of instances. For
example, the definition of energy efficiency is linked to a plurality of
accounting methods. According to the directive, “energy efficiency
means the ratio of output of performance, service, goods or energy, to
input of energy” [71] [our emphasis]. The metrics used to measure
services (e.g. contribution to GDP) and energy (e.g. megaJoules) are not
equivalent to each other and generate ambiguity in energy efficiency
indicators. Ambiguity is also present in target setting procedures: “Each
Member State shall set an indicative national energy efficiency target,
based on either primary or final energy consumption, primary or final
energy savings, or energy intensity” [71]. Vagueness can be seen in the
renewable energy directive of the EU. For instance, the sustainability
requirement is defined as: “Biofuel production should be sustainable.
Biofuels used for compliance with the targets laid down in this Direc-
tive, and those that benefit from national support schemes, should
therefore be required to fulfil sustainability criteria” [69].
A distinction should be made between ambiguity and vagueness.
Ambiguity is the uncertainty that emerges from complexity, while va-
gueness refers to the lack of clarity or specificity with which a term is
used. Both may be useful in policy processes, and may help generate
consensus, but vagueness is a political decision (e.g. the term energy
security is used in relation to geopolitical concerns to avoid explicit
mention of specific countries and regions, to which different member
states may have different relations), and ambiguity has to do with in-
commensurability in the knowledge base and the governance of un-
certainty. Ambiguity makes it possible for a plurality of knowledge
claims to be taken into account, extending the political space.
It should be noted that, although the framing of ambiguity is very
different in policy and in science, the uncertainty that arises from the
presence of multiple perspectives is seen as problematic in some in-
stances also in the policy realm. For example, a high priority for the EU
is the coordination of national energy policies, as expressed by the idea
of building an ‘Energy Union’ and including energy security in political
dialogues (last pillar of Table 2a). According to Natorski and Surallés,
“attempts to frame energy as a security issue in order to gain support for
a Common Energy Policy have been of limited effect, precisely because
the security framing contributed to the further legitimisation of EU
member states’ reluctance to cede sovereignty in the energy domain”
[65]. This policy measure can be interpreted as the pursuit for the ex-
plicit discussion of topics otherwise left vague and ambiguous. Fol-
lowing Matland [58], this instance can be interpreted as a case in which
ambiguity of goals is accepted (energy security), in order to reduce
ambiguity of means (coordination is needed).
5. Discussion
5.1. Implications of complexity and ambiguity for energy security
The more one digs into the materiality of energy security, the more
trade-offs, bottlenecks and lock-ins emerge. With reference to the nu-
clear power industry in France, Hecht [88] argues that policy effec-
tiveness relies on material effectiveness. That is, the ability to deliver on
material changes legitimizes policy, and the use of scientific evidence.
In the case of energy security, this relationship seems to lean not on
effectiveness but on uncertainty. Material effectiveness is elusive in the
context of complexity because of non-linearity and open causality, and
policy relies on ambiguity.
Uncertainty can be explained with reference to the complexity of
energy systems. Comparing the current state of the EU’s energy system
with the measures in EU documents, it becomes clear that (i) some
energy security measures play minor roles in the overall energy system,
neglecting larger lock-ins, and can be better understood as performing a
symbolic role; (ii) measures targeting different components or stages of
the energy system may generate important trade-offs and systemic
changes. For example:
- Technical security: increasing renewables may present challenges
for electric grid control due to the higher penetration of variable
sources into the electricity system [89];
- Market security: a higher integration of renewables in the electric
grid may also lead to increased prices for consumers due to feed-in-
tariffs. In Germany, for example, an increase in renewable electricity
generation led to lower prices for electricity producers and higher
prices for consumers [90];
- Nexus security: biofuels may increase energy security but pose
threats to food security, as documented extensively in the literature
(see, for example, [91]);
- Geopolitical security: decreasing reliance on imports may decrease
security threats caused by geopolitical issues, such as the Russian
gas halts, but may also reduce diversification of supply routes and
sources, making the system more vulnerable in times of unexpected
crises. This is referred to as import availability [4];
- Environmental security: domestic production of energy carriers may
increase local environmental impacts, such as water contamination;
- Technological security: increasing the use of nuclear power may
improve the security of electricity supply but pose other concerns,
both of plant security and uranium dependence.
Many of these trade-offs are acknowledged in the policy documents
analysed. The directives analysed mention grid control problems caused
by the increase in renewable energies, the dependence on fossil fuels for
Table 2b
Indirect measures of energy security in EU energy policy and their scales, grouped under their uncertainties.
Indirect measures Scales Uncertainties
Increasing diversification of sources [73,81], investment for a more secure grid [68], bioenergy [68],
increasing diversification of supply from third countries [81], reducing energy imports [81], deployment
of domestic sources [81], incentives to transmission and distribution operators [82], facilitating cross-
border access to new electricity suppliers [83], renewable energy [84] [81], decentralised energy
production [84], biomass fuels converted into electricity and heat [84]
EU, international, national
Forms of energy, energy
system
Uncertainty of supply
Energy efficiency [85] [68], reducing gas imports through efficiency [85], decarbonisation of the heating &
cooling sectors [84]
EU, national
Forms of energy, industrial
sector
Uncertainty of demand
Regional co-operation [81] Regional and EU Ambiguity
EU interconnections [82] EU, energy system Technological uncertainty
Short term markets and scarcity pricing [82], a well-functioning and transparent energy market [82] EU, national, energy sector Uncertainty of supply (market)
Achievement of EU energy and climate policy goals [86] EU, all economic sectors Indeterminacy
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transport, and the possible impacts of biofuels on food production [69].
The recurrent reference to risks, threats and urgency are means
through which the lack of effectiveness in energy governance is recast
as a security challenge. We argue that uncertainty (in the form of risk,
strict uncertainty and indeterminacy) is mobilised to frame energy
governance in terms of security. In this context, the use of a plurality of
policy measures, and the inconsistencies or trade-offs that arise from
such plurality reinforce the uncertainty element of energy security.
Ambiguity is thus functional to this mode of governance, and the
multiple representations that are produced by the scientific knowledge
base reinforce the construction of energy security as a challenge of
uncertainty, which requires governing.
Ambiguity in this context makes it possible to avoid a paralysis in
decision-making due to higher level uncertainties, and makes it possible
to form coalitions between different actors and discourses. By linking
all of the above measures to energy security, the complexity of the issue
is compressed to allow for decisions to be taken. Energy security is
almost always bundled up within a mix of justifications which tend to
include climate change and economic growth, as can be seen for ex-
ample in the recast proposal for renewable energy directive of 2016:
“Moreover, renewable energy is also emerging as a driver of inclusive
economic growth, creating jobs and reinforcing energy security across
Europe” [86]. Here, ambiguity is used both to group measures together
(ambiguity/vagueness of means), and to group targets such as security
and economic growth (ambiguity/vagueness of goals).
5.2. What does ambiguity imply for science advice to policy?
Recognising the relevance of ambiguity in decision making, the
discussion is now directed to how this affects the science-policy inter-
face. Clarifying the concept of energy security would mean showing
inconsistencies between representations, indicators and associated
measures. Therefore, reducing ambiguity may make scientific advice
less useful to governance. This observation runs counter to some of the
ethos of science for policy, which is manifested in the goals of in-
creasing clarity [25], providing a holistic view [25,29], putting
boundaries on the term [26], distinguishing between different logics of
energy security and investigating their political and normative con-
sequence [9].
A recurrent recommendation is that uncertainty should be analysed
and communicated [5,39,78]. The results presented here, however,
suggest that the communication of uncertainty at the science-policy
interface needs to take into account what type of uncertainty one is
dealing with. While risks, indeterminacy and ignorance are flagged as
problematic in policy, ambiguity plays a different role. Before aiming to
reduce ambiguity, it is important to take into account which policy
processes may be affected, and even disrupted, by reducing ambiguity.
“For example, the call for clear, explicit, and consistent goals contra-
dicts much of what is known about how legislation is passed” [52,
p.147].
Matland [58] argues that ambiguity is a means to reduce conflict
and hold together coalitions. The use of energy security as a recurrent
justification for a wide range of measures indicates that the term is used
to form coalitions, or mobilise existing ones. Meritet [92], for example,
highlights how energy security measures and discourses in France are
very different to those in other EU countries, given the role played by
nuclear power. Ambiguity thus helps maintain coherence at the EU
level, glossing over national differences.
The analysis of the role of ambiguity in policy processes shows that
ambiguity is not a deficit of knowledge, and that therefore it is not a
matter for scientific experts to “solve.” These considerations open the
debate about the role of science and science advice to policy in the
context of complexity and uncertainty. Policy recommendations in the
energy security literature are varied, ranging from “the institution of a
consultative process towards broadly accepted (…) fuel-specific pre-
miums” [31], the provision of a detailed analysis of risk [39], and
definitional clarity [19], to the support of “multilateral approaches and
concrete cooperation models” [6], “anticipating and assessing the ‘what
ifs’” [14], diplomatic and economic dialogues [66]. While we are
sympathetic to these suggestions, we refer to relational complexity to
argue that through ambiguity, multiple knowledge claims and multiple
sources of expertise are brought to bear on the policy process. Policy is
informed not only by scientific evidence, but also by political, economic
and social considerations. Ambiguity makes it possible to maintain a
dialogue with a wide range of actors, including but not limited to sci-
entific experts. We argue that it is important to take into account who
would benefit and who would loose from the clarification of ambiguity,
and to assess what is at stake behind different uses of the term.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we refer to energy security as an entry point to the-
orise the role of ambiguity in governance. Energy security is an am-
biguous term, with many competing and contradictory definitions. We
use complexity theory to argue that the multiple definitions refer to
non-equivalent representations of energy security, and cannot be re-
conciled or unified without losing relevant information. We conducted
a text analysis of academic publications and policy documents to
compare which types of uncertainty are mobilised, with a particular
focus on ambiguity, defined as the type of uncertainty arising from
complexity.
Many authors have focused on reducing the ambiguity of definitions
of energy security and have provided broad definitions that can capture
its multiple facets [16,17,26,31]. On the other hand, the definition of
energy security does not necessarily arise as a problem in EU public
policy. This incongruence between science and policy is not a problem
per se. Academia has different interests than policy, and what can be
interesting from a research perspective (conceptualising an ambiguous
term) may not be a priority in policymaking. Moreover, the interactions
between science and policy are rarely direct (with scientific evidence
guiding policymakers), and the effects of conceptualisation literature
can be diffuse [9], in helping to advance a field that may eventually
have impacts on policies. Since we relied only on secondary informa-
tion through text analysis, the differences in the treatment of ambiguity
between science and policy would benefit from further research based
on primary data through, for instance, interviews with both scientific
experts and policy-makers.
The results and discussion suggest that it is important to pay at-
tention to what is at stake before clarifying ambiguities at the science-
policy interface. This critical reflection should by no means be under-
stood as a call for irresponsible politics or post-factual decision-making.
Rather, it is important to understand the “network of artefacts,
knowledges and institutions” [62, p.257] that constitute energy gov-
ernance before prescribing good practice. To this purpose, we rely on a
relational understanding of complexity, which relates representation to
the institutions and the uses of knowledge. Returning to the debate
raised by Wellstead et al. [28] about the need to reduce ambiguity, we
argue that from a complexity point of view, reducing ambiguity would
entail (i) a normative choice of some scientific facts over others, and (ii)
a poor understanding of how plural and ambiguous knowledge is used
in policy processes, which would widen the gap between science and
policy, rather than closing it. In contrast, discussing the role of ambi-
guity in policy can help manage this gap and may foster an environment
for better dialogue between science and policy.
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